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Executive Summary 
Connecticut is a wealthy state. In 1999, per 
capita income in the state was the nation’s 
highest, 10 percent greater than in the next-
highest states, Massachusetts and New 
Jersey, and 37 percent higher than in the 
U.S. as a whole. Despite its overall wealth, 
the beauty of its landscape, the strength of 
its institutions and the rich history of its 
cities and towns, Connecticut is not immune 
from patterns of inequality and sprawl that 
are straining states across the nation. 
Connecticut Metropatterns finds that the 
way the state is growing is hurting all 
communities—from the most impoverished 
to the most affluent.  
Here are the report’s main findings: 
Simple contrasts between cities, suburbs 
and rural areas are out of date.  
• A growing number of small cities and 
older suburbs, home to nearly half of the 
state’s population, face significant and 
growing poverty with weak local tax 
bases. Their tax bases are 25 to 35 
percent below average and poverty in 
schools is growing even more quickly in 
these places than in the major cities. 1 
• Another group of outlying areas must 
cope with rapidly growing populations 
with lower-than-average tax bases that 
are also growing much more slowly than 
in the rest of the state. 
• A large group of fast-growing, middle-
class suburbs is struggling to provide the 
schools and infrastructure they need 
with just average resources. 
• Only a small share of the population 
lives in affluent suburbs with sizeable 
tax bases and few social needs. 
All types of communities are hurt by the 
way the state is growing. 
• The state’s fiscal system pits local 
governments against one another in a 
competition for tax base. This 
competition needlessly undermines the 
character of local communities, wastes 
resources, discourages cooperation and 
increases fiscal disparities. In fact, the 
disparity between Connecticut’s low- 
and high-tax base communities 
increased by more than 50 percent 
during the 1990s.  
• Geographic stratification concentrates 
the state’s poor in cities and towns with 
inadequate tax bases. Especially hard hit 
are Connecticut’s central cities. As a 
group, they must cope with poverty rates 
nearly three times the statewide average 
with local tax bases that are just 40 
percent of average and growing slowly. 
In part due to subtle housing 
discrimination, Connecticut’s black and 
Latino residents are more likely than 
other groups to live in these struggling 
communities.  
• Sprawling development threatens the 
state’s natural resources and farmland. 
The amount of land in urban or 
suburban uses increased more than eight 
times faster than population between 
1970 and 2000. 
All places would benefit from regional 
and statewide reforms. 
• Cooperative land-use planning can 
strengthen communities and preserve 
the environment.  
• Tax and state aid reforms can stabilize 
fiscally stressed schools, help 
communities pay for needed public 
services and reduce competition for tax 
base.  
• Enhanced roles for state government,  
councils of government or other regional 
organizations can help solve regional 
problems while ensuring that all 
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communities have a say in decision-
making. 
Change is possible. 
Cooperative efforts like these can encourage 
environmentally sensitive development, 
reduce inequalities among communities, 
encourage regional economic-development 
efforts and expand the opportunities of the 
state’s most vulnerable residents. These 
endeavors are already in effect in various 
forms throughout the country, and have 
impassioned, thoughtful advocates in 
Connecticut. 
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Connecticut Metropatterns 
In many people’s minds, Connecticut is 
comprised of three distinct zones—large, 
troubled cities, blocks of affluent suburbs 
and sleepy rural areas. But such labels and 
boundaries disguise a far more complex 
reality. In fact, analysis of Connecticut 
communities uncovered a diversity of fiscal 
and social conditions that crossed traditional 
boundaries.  
This report relied on cluster analysis to 
classify communities according to several 
fiscal, social and physical characteristics. 
(See sidebar on page 4 for a description of 
the clustering technique, page 5 for a map 
and page 34 for a summary of characteristics 
of each group.) The analysis dispels the 
myth of an affluent suburban monolith. In 
fact, more than half of all Connecticut 
residents live in small cities or suburbs 
facing the stresses of low and slow-growing 
tax resources. Another 14 percent of the 
state’s population lives in fiscally and 
socially strained central cities.  
Here are the six community types identified 
in this report: 
Central cities (14 percent of the state’s 
population, 4 communities): As a group, 
Connecticut’s central cities are severely 
stressed. These places must provide for their 
great social needs with tax resources less 
than half the statewide average and growing 
at one-eighth of the average rate. Their 
school poverty rates—measured by 
eligibility for the federal free-lunch program 
in elementary schools—are nearly three 
times the statewide average of 28 percent. 
Three of every four elementary students in 
the central cities are eligible. These factors 
dramatically hurt the prospects of these 
cities, discouraging investment and 
dramatically limiting the opportunities of 
residents. 
Despite these troubling traits, cities also 
have strengths—among them colleges and 
universities, historic buildings, arts and 
entertainment venues and attractive public 
spaces—that help them survive despite their 
difficulties. Although slipping slightly, the 
state’s large cities continue to have by far 
the greatest density of jobs of any 
community type, and they also have an 
above-average concentration of jobs to 
residents. Because of cities’ densities and 
locations, residents have the highest rate of 
mass transit use of any community type and 
among the shortest average commute times.  
Stressed (17 percent of population, 12 
communities): Like the largest cities, these 
communities have below-average commute 
times—the lowest of any group, in fact—
and a slightly smaller-than-average share of 
workers who drive to work alone. Also like 
central cities, stressed communities are 
suffering from significant and growing 
social needs and diminishing fiscal 
resources.  Already high free-lunch 
eligibility rates in the stressed group 
increased five times faster than the state 
average while school poverty levels in other 
community types declined or rose just 
slightly over the late 1990s.  
Low and slow-growing tax bases further 
compound the problems of stressed 
communities. In some instances these places 
find themselves in fiscal positions as 
difficult as the major cities. The number of 
jobs per resident worker in stressed 
communities is below average and stagnant 
as well. Aging infrastructure also contributes 
to high costs in these places.   
At-risk (28 percent of population, 43 
communities): These places are still stable 
by many measures—they have slightly 
below-average poverty rates in their schools, 
an average number of jobs per resident and 
greater-than-average job growth. But there 
are signs of stress afoot in these cities and 
towns. School poverty rates edged up 
slightly faster in this group than in the state 
as a whole during the 1990s. And although 
greater than in central cities or stressed 
communities on a per capita basis, property 
tax base and growth in property tax base in 
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these communities are still below the state 
averages, a fact that hinders their ability to 
adequately meet social and physical needs. 
These fiscal stresses are important because 
these places are growing—they contain 25 
percent of the land that urbanized during the 
1980s and 1990s. Policies to help local 
governments manage growth are critical to 
this group of communities because they feel 
tremendous pressure to attract development 
that will expand their tax bases. This 
pressure can drive land-use planning 
decisions and discourage a cooperative, 
regional approach to planning. 
Fringe-developing (6 percent of 
population, 31 communities): These 
communities are home to just a small 
fraction of the state’s residents. But they are 
experiencing the most rapid population 
gains—more than twice the rate of growth 
of the state as a whole. The speed and scale 
of growth in these communities brings its 
own stresses—requiring major investments 
in roads, sewers or schools that often strain 
even the hardiest tax bases. However, most 
fringe-development places do not command 
such big tax bases—on average, tax base 
within this group is slightly below the state 
average and growing much more slowly 
than average. 
As in the at-risk category, how these very 
low-density places manage their growth has 
important implications for the long-term 
development of the state—although they 
contained just 6 percent of the state’s 
population in 2000, 13 percent of the land 
that urbanized during the 1980s and 1990s 
was in these places. They are especially 
susceptible to the incentives in the tax 
system encouraging competition for tax base 
and discouraging cooperative planning.  
Bedroom-developing  (24 percent of 
population, 57 communities). Bedroom-
developing communities are what many 
would regard as prototypical suburbs—fast-
growing communities of mostly low-density 
residential development. Indeed, with their 
higher-achieving schools, spacious new 
homes and low levels of congestion, these 
places appear to offer an alternative to 
declining communities at the urban core.  
But the resulting growth can erode their 
advantages over time. Nearly half of the 
land in Connecticut that urbanized during 
the 1980s and 1990s was in these 
communities. This level of growth causes 
stress, as valued open space is lost to 
development and traffic congestion makes 
getting around more and more difficult. It 
also has serious fiscal implications. On 
average, property tax bases in this group are 
above the state average, but growing 
slowly—slower, even, than in the central 
cities and at-risk categories.  
Affluent (11 percent of population, 22 
communities): Mostly on the border with 
New York, these communities have a large 
share of the state’s expensive homes and a 
small share of the social strains. They have 
tax bases, on average, nearly three times the 
state average, and growing considerably 
faster than in every other community type. 
In fact, these places appear to reap all of the 
benefits of regional competition with few of 
the costs.  
But the opportunities of these prosperous 
suburbs are limited to just a lucky few. 
Many of these places have deep and 
growing job pools, but most have little racial 
or economic diversity, and few residential 
opportunities for low- and moderate-income 
households. Although their moderate rate of 
population growth assures that they can keep 
up with needed and locally funded 
infrastructure without overtaxing local 
resources, they rely heavily on infrastructure 
funded by other levels of government. 
Workers’ commute times are by far longer 
than those in any other community type. The 
share of workers using mass transit was also 
above average, largely due to the significant 
number heading into New York City by rail. 
All types of communities are hurt by the 
way Connecticut is growing 
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Nearly two-thirds of the state’s population—
65 percent—lives in cities or suburbs 
struggling with social or fiscal stresses. 
Stressed suburbs have problems typically 
associated with large cities, including weak 
tax bases and significant and growing 
poverty in their schools. At-risk suburbs 
must cope with continuing population 
growth and increasing social needs with 
below average tax bases that are barely 
growing. Fringe-developing places have 
fewer social needs, but are facing growth-
related costs with stagnant, below-average 
tax bases and modest household incomes.  
Even middle-class, bedroom-developing 
suburbs struggle to provide needed schools 
and infrastructure with largely residential 
tax bases. Just a small share of the 
population lives in affluent suburbs with 
expensive housing and plentiful commercial 
development. But even these places are 
suffering from the loss of valued open space, 
growing traffic congestion resulting from 
inefficient development and the extra costs 
felt statewide as a result of highly 
concentrated poverty. 
Sidebar:  
Cluster analysis: How it works 
Because there are 169 jurisdictions included 
in this study, it is impossible to individually 
measure each one against the others. Instead 
this study relies on a statistical procedure 
called cluster analysis to assign 
municipalities to groups that are as 
internally homogeneous and as distinct from 
one another as possible, based on specified 
social, fiscal and physical characteristics.2  
The characteristics used to group 
Connecticut municipalities were property 
tax base per household (2000), growth in 
property tax base per household (1995 to 
2000), the percentage of elementary students 
eligible for free lunches (2000), population 
growth (1990 to 2000) and population 
density (2000).3  
These variables provide a snapshot of a 
community in two dimensions—its ability to 
raise revenues from its local tax base and the 
costs associated with its social and physical 
needs. Fiscal capabilities are measured by 
tax base and the change in tax base.  
“Need” measures were selected to capture a 
range of local characteristics that affect the 
cost of providing public services. High 
poverty, measured by the percentage of 
elementary students eligible for the free-
lunch program, is a well-documented 
contributor to public service costs. It both 
generates greater needs for services and 
increases the cost of reaching a given level 
of service. Both population declines and 
large increases tend to increase the per-
person costs of long-lived assets like sewers, 
streets or buildings. When population 
declines, the costs of these assets must be 
spread across fewer taxpayers. When 
population is growing rapidly, the costs for 
new infrastructure tend to fall 
disproportionately on current residents 
(compared to future residents) because of 
the difficulty of spreading the costs over the 
full lifetime of the assets. Density is another 
important predictor of cost. Very low 
densities can increase per-person costs for 
public services involving transportation—
schools, police and fire protection—and for 
infrastructure—roads and sewers. Moderate 
to high densities, on the other hand, can help 
limit per-person costs. 
These variables also capture a cross-section 
of the socioeconomic characteristics that 
define a place’s political character. School 
demographics and population growth and 
density are among the factors people 
examine when deciding if a community is 
“their kind of place.”  
Because of their unique history and 
characteristics, Hartford, New Haven, 
Bridgeport and Waterbury were placed in 
their own group—called central cities—
before clustering.  
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Map 1.  Community Classification  
There are great inequalities in fiscal and 
social condition among Connecticut’s 169 
towns and cities—differences that don’t 
break along traditional city-suburb lines. 
The state’s four socially and fiscally stressed 
central cities, home to 14 percent of the 
state’s residents, struggle with poverty and 
fiscal strain. But a growing number of 
smaller cities, suburban and rural 
communities do, too. In fact, more than half 
of Connecticut residents live in suburban 
communities facing the stresses of either 
low and stagnant tax resources or high and 
increasing social and physical needs—
stressed, at-risk or fringe developing 
communities. Just a small share of the 
state’s population lives in affluent 
communities with very high tax bases and 
few social strains.  
 9
Social Separation and Sprawl 
Connecticut is a wealthy state. In 1999, per 
capita income in the state was the nation’s 
highest, 10 percent greater than in the next-
highest states, Massachusetts and New 
Jersey, and 37 percent higher than in the 
U.S. as a whole. Despite its overall wealth, 
the beauty of its landscape, the strength of 
its institutions and the rich history of its 
cities and towns, Connecticut is not immune 
from patterns of inequality and sprawl that 
are straining states across the nation.  
In fact, geographic stratification has already 
had devastating consequences for the poor, 
leaving many of them trapped in segregated 
neighborhoods with limited economic and 
educational opportunities. Now it has begun 
to diminish the quality of life and 
opportunities of working- and middle-class 
residents. No group—not even the 
wealthiest suburbs—is fully satisfied with 
the status quo. 
Population and employment change  
Population growth has been modest in 
Connecticut for decades. However, the 
distribution of population across the state 
has changed dramatically, with new 
development consuming previously 
undeveloped land at alarming rates. Between 
1970 and 2000, the amount of land settled at 
urban densities more than doubled—
increasing by 102 percent. During the same 
period, the state’s population increased by 
just 12 percent.4 
Connecticut’s modest overall 3 percent 
population growth during the 1990s hid 
dramatic shifts in population within the 
state. In spite of efforts to revitalize the 
state’s largest cities, most continued to lose 
significant numbers of residents, as did 
older, stressed small cities and suburban 
communities. As those places declined, 
many of the state’s outlying, suburban 
communities experienced rapid population 
growth.  
The effects of these unbalanced growth 
patterns have perhaps been most harmful in 
Hartford. During the 1990s, Hartford proper 
experienced a population loss of 13 
percent—the largest decline of any 
municipality in Connecticut.5 The 
tremendous population and job loss 
continued a long-term trend of concentrating 
the poor within Hartford, resulting in a 
poverty rate of 31 percent in 2000 (up from 
28 percent in 1990)—one of the highest 
rates of any city in the country.6 
Meanwhile, outlying communities across 
Connecticut are growing and attracting 
increasing shares of the state’s wealth. 
These places are developing at much lower 
densities than older communities did.  
Density is such an important characteristic 
of a place because density shapes many 
aspects of life. Moderate- to high-density 
development can help preserve open space, 
reduce the length of car trips, make mass 
transit a more viable option for commuters, 
and reduce housing prices by decreasing 
land costs. 
Low-density development, like much of 
what is taking place in fast-growing 
Connecticut communities, exacerbates the 
need for roads, provides few opportunities 
for effective mass transit and harms the 
environment. It is also associated with 
increased per-person costs for some services 
including schools, police and fire and, often, 
with higher housing prices. 
Changing employment patterns place similar 
stresses on communities. Employment in 
Connecticut is growing, but it is increasingly 
diffused. Between 1993 and 1998, the at-
risk, fringe developing, bedroom-developing 
and affluent categories all experienced job 
growth, while stressed communities and 
central cities experienced job decline. 
Hartford again proves an extreme example: 
from 1992 to 1997, the city lost 12 percent 
of its job base, while nearby suburban 
employment grew by 3 percent.  
Job Growth: 1995 - 2000 Percentage Change
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This outward movement of population, jobs 
and housing development has important 
implications for all of Connecticut. Rapid 
increases in population and jobs often 
burden communities with significant public 
costs, such as roads, sewers and schools. In 
the places left behind, population decline 
takes its toll, too, leaving fewer people—and 
often those with fewer personal resources—
to fund public services and support local 
businesses. 
Environmental harm 
The way the state is growing harms not only 
its citizens, but also its natural and built 
environment. Unmanaged growth threatens 
air and water quality, natural habitat and 
valuable farmland. In the Connecticut River 
Valley near Hartford, new development 
often replaces farmland. In Fairfield County, 
it often replaces forests. Loss of forest and 
farmland means loss of wildlife habitat and 
fragmentation of essential breeding areas for 
songbirds.7  
As homes, office parks and shopping centers 
rise in these areas, impervious surfaces 
increase. As a result, less rain is absorbed 
into the ground. By impeding the recharge 
of groundwater, the expansion of impervious 
surfaces increases runoff, which can cause 
local flooding and pollute lakes and rivers. 
Increased lawn and garden areas also lead to 
increased—and often excessive—use of 
fertilizer and pesticides, which run off into 
groundwater and rivers, reducing water 
quality and harming fish and shellfish in 
local waters and Long Island Sound. Traffic 
resulting from sprawling development 
contributes to the pollution of Connecticut’s 
air and water. 
The state’s $2 billion a year agricultural 
industry is also feeling the squeeze. 8 
Between 1987 and 1997, the state lost 
39,087 acres of farmland, nearly a 10 
percent drop.9 The loss of farmland is 
important for many reasons. Farms are a 
valuable part of the state’s tourism industry. 
In addition, owners of farmland and forests 
pay more in local taxes than it costs local 
government to service their properties.10  
Traffic congestion 
The result of sprawling development 
perhaps most apparent to Connecticut’s 
residents is the state’s strained transportation 
system. By 2000, Connecticut workers 
experienced median commutes of 24 
minutes, up 16 percent from 1990—a faster 
increase than in the U.S. as a whole.11  Fully 
80 percent of Connecticut’s 1.6 million 
workers drove to work alone in 2000, up 
nearly three percentage points from the 
previous decade. The largest drop from 1990 
to 2000 was among those who carpooled 
and those who walked to work. In 2000, 
fewer than 9 percent of commuters 
carpooled and 2.5 percent walked to work. 
Another 2.5 percent took the bus. Although 
ridership on Metro North has increased in 
recent years, fewer than 2 percent of 
commuters take the train.12 The shift in 
commuting habits can have both short- and 
long-term effects upon traffic congestion 
and the environment.  
Faced with more cars and longer trips, state 
transportation officials are continuing to add 
and expand roads. Connecticut was once 
infamous for failed bridges. A recent report 
credits the state Department of 
Transportation for their maintenance but 
more investment in the existing road system 
will be required to keep pace with needs.13  
Connecticut motorists spend an average of 
372 hours driving on highways in poor, 
mediocre or fair condition, accumulating a 
total annual cost of over $29 million in auto 
repairs resulting from their condition—
three-quarters as much as the Connecticut 
highway department has spent fixing these 
same roads.14  
Considering that significant investments in 
infrastructure and housing have already been 
made in core areas, state (and often federal) 
investments in roads and highways in 
previously undeveloped areas are an 
inefficient use of taxpayers’ limited 
 11
resources. They not only encourage more 
sprawling development in outlying 
communities but they also further divert 
resources from existing highways and 
communities that arguably need them the 
most. 
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Captions: 
Map 2. Connecticut: Percentage Change 
in Population by Census Tract, 1990-2000 
Changes in population help show which 
communities are burdened with the costs of 
rapid growth and which are hurt by 
population losses. During the 1990s, 
population grew fastest in southwestern and 
east-central portions of Connecticut. 
Municipalities experiencing the biggest 
declines include Hartford and Norfolk. 
Sprawl strains both fast-growing and 
declining communities by increasing the 
per-person costs of public facilities like 
sewers, streets or buildings. That’s because 
population declines require communities to 
spread costs across fewer taxpayers, while 
rapid growth pushes its costs 
disproportionately on existing residents, not 
the ones who will take advantage of new 
facilities in the future. 
Map 3. Sprawl map 
Despite the fact that population is growing 
at only modest rates, housing development 
continues to consume more and more 
previously undeveloped land. Between 1970 
and 2000, population grew by just 12 
percent but the amount of land in residential 
uses increased by more than 100 percent. 
The trend improved in the 1990s, but land 
consumption still outpaced population 
growth by more than 2.5-to-1 (9.4 percent 
compared to 3.6 percent). 
Map 4. Connecticut: Total Jobs per 100 
Persons by Municipality, 1998 
Places with more jobs than workers are the 
destination of a significant number of 
commuters. In Connecticut, most are located 
along major highways. There is a significant 
employment center in and around Hartford, 
including Avon, Bloomfield, East Hartford, 
East Windsor, Farmington, Granby, 
Newington, Windsor, and Windsor Locks. 
Elsewhere in the state, there are sizable 
employment clusters in the southwestern 
corner, including Danbury, Greenwich, 
Norwalk, Stamford, and Westport; in and 
around New Haven; and the mouth of the 
Thames River, including New London, 
Waterford and Groton. Areas with few jobs 
per resident include many of the outlying 
communities of eastern and western 
Connecticut. 
Map 5. Connecticut: Percentage Change 
in Jobs per 100 Persons by Municipality, 
1993-1998 
Job shifts contribute significantly to the 
costs of sprawl, increasing infrastructure 
needs—especially for roads—in growing 
places. Jobs decentralized even more 
quickly than population during the 1990s—
central cities and many nearby towns saw 
declines in the number of jobs per 100 
residents. In the Hartford area, the northern 
suburbs fared well while those to the south 
did not. Nearly all of the suburbs bordering 
Bridgeport fared poorly as jobs moved 
outward to the north or westward along the 
coast. Coastal areas fared best in the New 
Haven area while all of the towns adjacent 
to Waterbury increased their ratio of jobs to 
residents. 
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Poverty and Race 
Connecticut is not immune from the 
devastating pattern of social stratification  
that is dividing American metropolitan 
areas. Separation by race and income, a 
pattern that has developed concurrently with 
sprawling growth, limits the opportunities 
available to large segments of the 
population. Connecticut’s communities are 
highly segregated, with poor people of color 
disproportionately located in its large cities 
and stressed communities, places with the 
highest shares of affordable housing and low 
and slow-growing tax bases. 
The problems associated with concentrated 
poverty—everything from higher crime and 
troubled schools to poor health—place a 
significant burden on city resources, 
discourage investment in those 
neighborhoods and dramatically limit the 
opportunities of residents. Ultimately people 
living in high-poverty neighborhoods 
become isolated from educational, 
employment and social opportunities 
available in other parts of the region, making 
it extremely difficult for them to participate 
fully in the regional economy. 
This divide is also reflected in the state’s 
schools. Community stability depends 
greatly on the performance of schools, 
because when the perceived quality of a 
school declines, it can set in motion a 
vicious cycle of middle-class flight and 
disinvestment.15  
Many schools in smaller cities and older 
suburbs are now showing the same patterns 
of social change that occurred a generation 
ago in central cities. From 1993 to 2000, 
most of the communities classified as 
stressed experienced significant increases in 
student poverty. In Meriden, New Britain 
and West Haven, for instance, school 
poverty increased by more than 10 
percentage points. But rapid increases were 
not limited to these places. A number of at-
risk communities—Windsor and Eastford, 
for example—and fringe-developing places 
like Hampton and Preston experienced sharp 
increases in poverty during the period. 
This shifting socioeconomic pattern has 
serious effects. Eventually, when schools 
reach certain thresholds of poverty, middle-
class families with children—those of all 
races—will leave the public schools and 
often the community, and they will 
eventually be followed by other middle-
class segments of the housing market.  
The departure of the middle class from a 
neighborhood strains both old and new 
communities. In fast-growing communities 
at the edge of the region, the middle class is 
streaming into increasingly overcrowded, 
underfunded schools. But this exodus has an 
even greater effect on those who have been 
left behind in communities of concentrated 
poverty. Concentrated poverty destroys the 
lives of the people trapped in them, leaving 
them with few opportunities for good 
education and good jobs.16 Schools with 
concentrated poverty often suffer from risk 
factors—everything from inexperienced 
teachers to unstable enrollment—that lower 
educational achievement among students 
and diminish their prospects for the future.17  
The degree of segregation of poor students 
in Connecticut is high even when compared 
to major U.S. metropolitan areas. In the 25 
largest metropolitan areas in the late 1990s, 
an average of 54 percent of poor children 
would have to change schools in order to 
achieve an identical mix of poor and non-
poor students in each one.18 In Connecticut 
as a whole, 58 percent of poor children 
would have to change schools to achieve 
such a mix of students.19 
While poverty and its consequences underlie 
this pattern of social separation, it is difficult 
to separate poverty from race and 
ethnicity—particularly for African 
Americans and Hispanics who are strongly 
discriminated against in the housing market, 
and disproportionately suffer from the 
effects.20 Asian students were not included 
in the analysis of racial segregation in this 
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report because research has shown that they 
tend to experience less educational and 
housing segregation than blacks and 
Hispanics. 21 
When black and Latino students are 
segregated in schools where the majority of 
students are non-white, they are also likely 
to find themselves in schools where the 
majority of students are poor. Across the 
state, the percentage of non-Asian minority 
students attending high-poverty schools was 
72 percent, compared to just 12 percent for 
white and Asian students.22 
In fact, 68 percent of minority students in 
Connecticut would have to move to achieve 
an identical mix of minority and non-
minority students in each school, compared 
to an average of 61 percent in the nation’s 
25 largest metropolitan areas. 
It is in the state’s older, stressed suburbs and 
small cities where the fastest racial change is 
taking place. The gradually expanding black 
and Latino middle class, in pursuit of the 
American dream, begins moving away from 
poverty.  In their search for new homes, they 
are frequently steered to areas where their 
presence will be the least controversial.23 
When these new residents reach a critical 
mass in a neighborhood and its schools, 
white homebuyers, perceiving the 
community to be in decline, choose not to 
buy there, and before long, whites already 
living in the neighborhood move away.  
The consequent decline in demand causes 
housing prices to fall, and poorer individuals 
of all races move into the homes vacated by 
the middle-class whites. The earlier 
perceptions become reality. In a short time, 
the new middle-class migrants find 
themselves in the same kind of 
neighborhoods they sought to escape just a 
few years earlier. These patterns perpetuate 
both the outward expansion of social strain 
and flawed assumptions about the 
contributions of minority residents to a 
community.   
Urban minority residents in Connecticut are 
subjected to other, subtler forms of 
discrimination as well. For example, towns 
in Connecticut are replacing their old “town 
dumps” with regional solid waste disposal 
systems. A recent analysis found that these 
regional facilities, which degrade air quality 
in adjacent areas, are located closer to 
minority and poor neighborhoods.24 In 
addition, rates of hospitalization and 
emergency room visits for children with 
asthma were disproportionately high in the 
state’s five largest cities and low-income 
towns.25 In New Haven, for instance, there 
was a 78 percent increase in admissions 
among children under 14 between 1992 and 
1996.26 In addition, asthma rates and 
mortality rates from asthma are considerably 
higher for blacks and Hispanics than for 
Connecticut’s white population.27 
Affordable housing 
A system of local governance like 
Connecticut’s—a highly fragmented system 
where municipal governments are required 
by the state to rely heavily on property taxes 
for revenues—creates strong incentives for 
local governments to limit their supply of 
affordable housing. From their point of 
view, housing affordable to moderate- or 
low-income households does not “pay its 
way” because the local service costs 
(schools, public safety and other local 
services) exceed the resulting property tax 
revenues.  
When played out over an entire metropolitan 
area or state, this process can result in 
overall shortages of affordable housing and 
severe limitations on where households of 
limited means can live. Both of these 
outcomes can be seen in Connecticut. 
The cost of housing is a serious problem in 
Connecticut. Nearly 68,000 new or 
rehabilitated units of affordable housing 
would be needed to meet the current needs 
of the poorest Connecticut households.28 A 
full-time worker requires a wage of $17.03 
per hour to afford a two-bedroom apartment 
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in the state.29 At present the minimum wage 
is $6.70 per hour.30 
Problems finding affordable housing extend 
well beyond the state’s low-income 
community. Many people with moderate 
incomes—police, firefighters and teachers—
have difficulty finding adequate housing. 
When affordability was computed separately 
within 10 housing markets across the state, 
there were 56 cities and towns in the state 
where less than 28 percent of the housing 
(including rental units) was affordable to a 
household with 80 percent of the regional 
median income (see Map 12). In another 32 
places, the affordability rate was between 28 
and 38 percent. Even affluent people are 
often concerned that their children won’t be 
able to afford to live in the towns in which 
they grew up.31 Lack of affordable housing 
also means that many workers must 
commute long distances. 
This problem has a racial component as 
well. Connecticut ranks at the bottom—48th 
out of 50 states—in minority 
homeownership. Fewer than 32 percent of 
African Americans own homes in 
Connecticut compared to 44 percent 
nationwide and only 26 percent of Hispanics 
in Connecticut are homeowners compared to 
46 percent nationwide.32 A recent 
nationwide study also documents the 
continued spatial mismatch between where 
black and Latino citizens live and where 
jobs are. Affordable housing and 
transportation policies are the keys to 
closing the gap.33 
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Map 6. Percentage of Elementary 
Students Eligible for Free Lunch by 
School, 2000 
The percentage of students eligible for free 
lunches is a commonly used measure of a 
community’s current health and its future 
well-being. (See footnote 1 for the eligibility 
rules.) Connecticut’s major urban centers 
and other stressed communities—among 
them Bridgeport, Hartford, Waterbury, New 
Britain, Danbury, Stamford, Meriden, 
Middletown, Ansonia, Derby and East 
Hartford—contain the highest 
concentrations of poor children. In the 
eastern portion of the state, Windham, 
Norwich and New London also suffer from 
high levels of student poverty. Poverty 
levels are quite low in most outlying areas of 
the state. 
Map 7. Connecticut: Change in 
Percentage Points of Elementary Students 
Eligible for Free Lunch by School, 1993-
2000 
Some of the already poorest schools in the 
state got rapidly poorer between 1993 and 
2000. They include schools in New Britain, 
Bridgeport, Norwich and Waterbury, where 
rates of student poverty grew by more than 
10 percentage points. However, increases in 
school poverty are not limited to the urban 
and stressed communities. Although many 
outlying areas still had low rates of poverty 
in 2000, many experienced relatively rapid 
rates of increase in poverty in the preceding 
years. Many schools in Hartford and New 
Haven saw stable or declining poverty, 
although levels at the end of the period 
remained quite high.  
Map 8. Percent of Non-Asian Minority 
Elementary Students by School, 2000 
The lack of regional cooperation among 
Connecticut communities helps create great 
extremes among places. Those extremes 
show up clearly in schools. Due in part to 
subtle discrimination in the housing market, 
schools in Connecticut are highly segregated 
not just by income, but also by race. In fact, 
although patterns of income and race tend to 
mirror one another, the degree of racial 
segregation is even more severe. Minority 
students are largely concentrated in and 
around the state’s central cities and stressed 
communities.  
Map 9. Connecticut: Change in 
Percentage Points of Non-Asian Minority 
Elementary Students by School, 1993-
2000 
Bolstered by the growing number of 
immigrants arriving in the state, as a group, 
Connecticut schools are becoming more 
racially diverse. But gains in the enrollment 
of students of color are not evenly 
distributed across the state. Central cities are 
a major locus. While the share of minority 
students in local schools is growing across 
the community types, the greatest increases 
are in stressed and at-risk communities, 
including Windsor, Windham and West 
Haven. Although many schools in central 
cities, starting from a very high base of 
minority students, did not increase their 
share of minority enrollment, the overall 
trends perpetuated existing patterns of racial 
segregation.  
Map 10.  Connecticut: Median Income 
Connecticut’s communities are highly 
stratified by income. Households with lower 
median incomes are disproportionately 
located in Connecticut’s cities, stressed and 
at-risk communities. Hartford is the most 
impoverished community, with a median 
income that is one-sixth that of 
Connecticut’s most affluent municipality.  
Following closely behind Hartford are New 
Haven, New Britain and Waterbury. The 
four communities with the highest median 
income—Darien, Weston, New Canaan and 
Wilton—are all New York suburbs located 
on Connecticut’s “Gold Coast.” 
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Map 11.  Connecticut: Median Income 
Change 
Many of the state’s lowest income places 
saw significant declines in median 
household income (adjusted for inflation) 
during the 1990s. They include places like 
Hartford, East Haven, New Haven, 
Bridgeport, and Windham. However, 
declines were not limited to low-income 
places. Many moderate- and high-income 
communities also experienced similar 
declines, including Stamford, Norwalk, 
West Hartford, Sherman and South 
Windsor. 
Map 12.  Percentage of Housing Units 
Affordable to Households with 80 percent 
of the Regional Median Income by 
Municipality, 2000 
The distribution of affordable housing in 
Connecticut is very uneven. An even 
distribution of affordable housing gives 
people of all incomes greater choice in 
where they live, reduces the costs of dealing 
with poverty by ensuring that it is not 
concentrated in just a few places and 
increases the chances that people live close 
to their jobs. Communities with very little 
affordable housing are in the western half of 
the state for the most part, especially in the 
southwest. However, affordability rates are 
relatively low in many towns spread across 
the state.
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Fiscal Inequality  
As a rich state, Connecticut is viewed by 
many as nearly uniformly wealthy, with 
urban pockets of decline and blight. But the 
fiscal story in Connecticut makes it clear 
that that there are far more communities 
facing fiscal strains than most people 
suspect. 
 
That’s because the local fiscal landscape in 
Connecticut is dominated by much greater-
than-average reliance on property taxes to 
finance municipal services and schools. This 
places tremendous pressure on most 
communities to attract development that will 
expand their property tax bases. This can 
drive local land-use planning decisions, 
encourage sprawl and increase economic 
and social stratification—all without 
contributing to the regional economy.  
To win the most profitable land uses, local 
governments may offer public subsidies or 
infrastructure improvements. But perhaps 
the most common approach is “fiscal 
zoning”—making land-use decisions not 
based on the intrinsic suitability of the land 
or the long-term needs of the region, but on 
the tax revenue it can generate right away. 
For example, a region as a whole benefits 
when most communities contain a mix of 
housing choices because workers have a 
choice of communities to live in. But 
individual localities can reap fiscal benefits 
by severely limiting the land zoned for 
multifamily development or by requiring 
very large (and therefore more expensive) 
homes and lots, effectively excluding low- 
and moderate people from their borders. 
Disparities are growing  
The effects of this competition are evident in 
the dramatically different abilities of 
Connecticut’s local governments to finance 
public services. One way to measure the 
disparities among communities is the ratio 
of tax base in a high-capacity place (the one 
at the 95th percentile) to the tax base in a 
low-capacity community (the one at the 5th 
percentile). In 2000, if all the municipalities 
in the state had levied the state’s average 
property tax rates, the revenues coming to 
the 95th percentile municipality would have 
been 5.3 times the revenue of the 5th 
percentile municipality. Put another way, for 
all residents of the state to receive equal 
levels of public services, municipalities with 
the lowest tax bases would have to tax 
residents at over 5 times the rate of those 
with the highest tax bases—something that 
no place can afford to do if it hopes to 
succeed in the competition for businesses 
and residents.34   
State and federal aid reduces these 
disparities, but it doesn’t eliminate them. For 
municipal services, the ratio narrows to 4.3 
when state aid is included. In Connecticut, 
as elsewhere, state government takes a much 
stronger role in school finance than in 
municipal finance. As a result, the 95th-to-
5th ratio for public schools narrows more 
after aid is added, falling from 5.3 to 2.3.  
The fiscal disparities among communities 
have been getting worse over time. In 1990 
the ratio of tax base in the 95th percentile 
municipality to that in the 5th percentile 
municipality was just 3.4. That means the 
disparity between low- and high-tax base 
communities increased over 50 percent in a 
decade. 
Competition for tax base 
The competition for tax base among local 
governments creates the potential for a 
vicious, self-reinforcing cycle of decline in 
places that “lose” the competition early in 
the game. As a municipality loses tax base, 
it faces a choice—it can levy high tax rates 
in order to provide competitive public 
services or provide relatively few, or low 
quality, services at competitive tax rates. 
Either choice puts it at a disadvantage in the 
competition for jobs and residents, leading 
to further losses and further declines in its 
ability to compete.  
Property Tax Base Per Household
(inflation-adjusted)
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Older communities in Connecticut’s urban 
cores are doubly hurt by these trends. These 
places must contend with aging 
infrastructure, industrial pollution, 
concentrations of poverty, higher crime 
rates, and other factors that strain their 
limited resources. With their low property 
values, they have few resources to provide 
for their great needs. They cannot reinvest to 
rebuild sewer systems and roads, rehabilitate 
housing, maintain parks or clean up polluted 
land without state or federal aid. Those 
burdens make it even more difficult for 
these communities to remain competitive 
with newer communities that offer cheaper 
land, newer homes and more open space.  
Meanwhile, places that “win” the most 
lucrative homes and businesses can provide 
high-quality services at more reasonable 
rates, in turn attracting even more economic 
activity.  
But there are actually few winners in this 
competition. For many communities on the 
urban edge, all is not well, either. The same 
patterns that hurt older, struggling 
communities also discourage long-term 
planning that would allow growing 
communities to develop in an orderly and 
efficient way. Because competition for 
certain land uses can be so intense—and the 
impact of losing so severe—communities 
often feel they have to grab all the 
development they can before it leaves for 
another place. That is especially true in 
newly developing communities, trying to 
build an adequate tax base to pay for their 
growing needs and to pay off debts on new 
infrastructure. But these low-capacity places 
are rarely in a good position to win the 
competition for the most “profitable” land 
uses, ending up instead with moderately 
priced single-family housing that generates 
more costs—for schools, roads and 
sewers—than they produce in revenues. 
The result of fiscal zoning and the other 
strategies communities embrace to attract 
tax base is the concentration of households 
with the greatest need for public services in 
communities that are the least able to 
generate the revenue to provide them.  
Tax policies discourage investment 
Connecticut’s property tax is structured in a 
way that adversely impacts new 
development. While the property tax covers 
both land and buildings, the major burden of 
the tax is applied to the buildings or 
improvements made on that land.35 This 
creates a disincentive to maintain existing 
buildings, rehabilitate them or add new 
structures. The result is often land 
speculation, in which the owner holds the 
land without making improvements to it, 
since the land itself will not be taxed at the 
rate that a new development would. When 
that happens, the existing buildings 
deteriorate over time, and vacant lots 
accumulate in the cities. When land 
speculation occurs, leapfrog development 
often follows, resulting in loss of farmland 
and open space for new developments.  
In urban centers, which urgently need the 
new development to boost their tax rolls and 
stabilize income streams, the tax effect is 
disastrous as the cities physically decline 
and potential new commercial development 
projects end up in neighboring 
municipalities.  
School finance 
Schools provide another dramatic example 
of the mismatch between needs and 
resources. School districts comprise an 
important part of Connecticut’s local fiscal 
landscape. In fact, the majority of property 
tax payments in the state go to schools—55 
percent in 2001.  
When districts’ needs are compared to their 
fiscal capacities, disparities are more 
evident. To measure the combined effects of 
capacity and needs, this study created a 
classification system for school districts.  
In this system, districts were first grouped 
by revenue capacity per pupil. That’s the 
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revenue a district would generate for each 
student if it assessed the state’s average tax 
rate to its own tax base, plus state and 
federal aid. Districts with capacities per 
pupil at least 20 percent above the statewide 
average were classified as high capacity. 
Those with capacities at least 20 percent 
below average were classified as low 
capacity. The remaining districts—about 
half of the total—were considered moderate 
capacity. Then districts were categorized as 
either low- or high-cost. High-cost districts 
fit at least one of three criteria—a free lunch 
eligibility rate among elementary students 
greater than 40 percent, enrollment growth 
exceeding 30 percent (about 4 percent per 
year) over a seven-year period, or an 
enrollment decline of any size during the 
period (see Map 13).36 
The results reveal that 57 percent of students 
are enrolled in districts showing at least one 
sign of stress—low fiscal capacity or high 
costs. Stressed districts are spread relatively 
evenly across the state. 
Comparing school district classifications to 
municipality classifications (Map 1), we can 
see that the bulk of the high-stress 
municipalities—central cities, stressed and 
at-risk communities—are served by school 
districts facing at least one type of stress. 
This magnifies disparities as school and 
municipal services compete for scarce 
public resources. Connecticut’s existing 
state aid for education, while important, 
does not equalize schools sufficiently to pull 
the plug on the outmigration of families 
seeking the best education for their children.
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Captions:  
Map 13. Property Tax Base per 
Household, 2000 
The ability of a community to pay for 
needed public services depends on both the 
costs of providing the services and its 
capacity to raise revenues. Many of the 
communities with high tax base are affluent 
ones with few social needs. Low tax bases 
are found in many of the places struggling 
with social strain—large cities and stressed 
and at-risk communities. Tax base per capita 
in the western portion of the state is higher 
than elsewhere, due largely to its proximity 
to the New York region and the presence of 
expensive second homes. By contrast, the 
state’s central and smaller cities, as well as 
municipalities such as Naugatuck and 
Windham, clearly lag behind the rest of the 
state, with property tax bases far below the 
statewide average. Near central cities there 
are affluent enclaves, such as Avon, 
Madison and Woodbridge. 
Map 14. Percentage Change in Property 
Tax Base per Household by Municipality, 
1995-2000 
When a municipality’s tax base shrinks, 
officials must choose either to increase tax 
rates in order to maintain services or hold 
the line on taxes and provide fewer or lower 
quality services. Either choice puts them at a 
disadvantage in the regional competition for 
jobs and residents. This dilemma is in play 
in the state’s large cities, and in stressed and 
at-risk municipalities, including rural places 
like Hartland, Haddam and most of eastern 
Connecticut. Many communities in the 
western part of the state saw significant 
gains in tax base during the 1990s.  
Map 15. School District Classification 
Like municipalities, school districts must 
provide needed services with the revenues 
their tax bases produce. In Connecticut, 40 
percent of elementary students are enrolled 
in districts struggling with relatively high 
costs but with only low to moderate ability 
to pay for them. Another 30 percent are in 
districts facing just high costs or low 
capacities. 
A district’s ability to raise revenues is 
measured by revenue capacity—the amount 
of money the district would receive per 
pupil if it assessed the state’s average school 
tax rate to its own tax base plus its actual 
state and federal aid. 
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LOOKING FORWARD:   
STRATEGIES FOR ENHANCING 
CONNECTICUT’S QUALITY OF LIFE 
 
Connecticut has great strengths in its people, 
its natural beauty, and the enviable quality 
of life enjoyed by many. However, the state 
is changing, and not solely for the better. 
Future economic vitality and quality of life 
are at risk. 
Connecticut’s present fiscal system 
promotes an unhealthy competition between 
municipalities for the property tax-base 
growth they need to pay for public services. 
This in turn often leads to land-use decisions 
that promote uncoordinated growth and 
costly, inefficient development. These forces 
conspire to promote negative socioeconomic 
outcomes that now directly harm many in 
Connecticut, and threaten to harm even 
those who may think they live a safe 
distance away from such problems. 
Social separation and reduced access to 
opportunity prevent many low-income 
people from making a good life and 
contributing to the state’s overall economic 
vitality. The state faces environmental 
degradation of key assets such as farmland, 
ridgelines and watersheds unless current 
trends are faced and corrective action is 
taken. The dominance of the automobile 
generates more and more congestion, which 
slowly chips away at the character of 
suburban and rural towns. Left unchecked, 
the pace of sprawl is likely to accelerate and 
low-density, uncoordinated development 
will likely become the dominant pattern in 
the state. 
 
Connecticut Metropatterns is designed to 
provide a new perspective on and reliable 
information about these broad trends, and to 
contribute to the debate on how Connecticut 
can promote economic vitality and access to 
a high quality of life for its citizens. 
 
Connecticut can build on its strengths and 
reshape the trends that work against it.  
Positive change is possible. Leaders in 
government and the private sector need to 
engage Connecticut’s citizens in a high-
profile effort to develop and implement 
regional and statewide strategies addressing 
three areas: 
 
• Greater fiscal capacity and equity 
among local governments. 
 
• Smarter planning in land use, 
transportation, environmental protection 
and affordable housing. 
 
• More effective regional leadership and 
decision-making.  
 
Successful, substantive initiatives in these 
three areas will benefit urban, suburban and 
rural communities. 
In addition to addressing specific problems, 
these strategies are mutually reinforcing.  
Successfully implementing one makes 
implementing the others much easier, both 
substantively and politically. 
Fiscal Equity 
An area ripe for reform is Connecticut’s 
state-local revenue system. Municipalities’ 
heavy reliance on the property tax to fund 
local public services, particularly K-12 
public education, drives several destructive 
trends, including municipal competition for 
tax base, social and economic separation, 
unequal educational opportunity and 
sprawling development.  In too many 
communities, the need for public services 
far outstrips the ability of the property tax 
base to raise the monies needed to pay for 
such services. The fiscal imperatives of the 
present system work against inter-municipal 
and regional cooperation, particularly in 
land use. 
Connecticut currently faces a large state 
budget deficit. The present pattern of 
development requires vast expenditures of 
public money, costing citizens and 
businesses dearly. It cannot be justified.   
The problems with both the state and local 
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components of Connecticut’s revenue 
system underscore the need and the 
opportunity for structural reform. Such 
reform should strive to improve the ability 
of both the state and municipal governments 
to effectively and equitably raise the 
revenues needed to fund public services.  
The following ideas should be considered: 
• Reduce municipal reliance on the 
property tax to fund public services.  
The present over-reliance hurts almost 
all cities and towns in different, though 
related, ways. 
 
• Move more of the cost of K-12 public 
education from local property taxes to 
the statewide revenue system, at least to 
the 50-50 cost-sharing level long 
identified as a goal for Connecticut.  
 
• Improve the incentives in the property-
tax system. A split-rate property tax—
where land is taxed more heavily than 
improvements—would create incentives 
for more intensive use of land, 
discouraging abandonment and sprawl. 
The current system does the opposite.37 
 
• Consider different forms of regional and 
statewide revenue or tax-base sharing. 
Such programs can improve the 
incentives in the property-tax system, 
reduce fiscal inequities and provide 
much needed resources to invest in 
regional assets and service delivery. 
Map 16 shows the great potential of this 
kind of program. A modest tax-base 
sharing program during the 1990s could 
have improved the fiscal position of 
cities and towns serving 70 percent of 
the state’s residents. At the same time, it 
would have reduced the incentive for 
wasteful competition for tax base by 
sharing the benefits of development, no 
matter where it occurs. 
• Re-evaluate and make other needed 
adjustments in the state-local revenue 
system. Reforms should focus on 
increasing the capacity, stability and 
equity of the system. 
Although Connecticut has made in-roads in 
some of these areas already, there is much 
more to be done. The state has increased its 
education funding in the three decades since 
the Supreme Court ruled in Horton v. 
Meskill that a system of school financing 
relying largely on local property taxes is 
unconstitutional.38 However, Connecticut’s 
public education system is still more reliant 
on local property taxes than all other states 
in the nation and the state’s share of school 
spending is only 40 percent (below all but 
seven other states) and declining.39 In 
addition, Connecticut’s wealthiest towns 
still spend about 20 percent more per pupil 
than the poorest towns despite the fact that, 
adjusted for income, citizens of the wealthy 
places have a lower tax burden.40 The state 
must take greater steps toward reducing 
disparities by reducing reliance on the 
property tax to fund education.  
State tax policies should also encourage 
residents and businesses to locate in central 
cities, stressed cities and towns and at-risk 
places. Connecticut has enacted three pieces 
of legislation within the last two years that 
move in this direction. The Connecticut 
Municipal Fiscal Disparities Act establishes 
a process to identify and assist 
municipalities suffering from fiscal distress, 
and sets out the steps that the state and 
nearby municipalities must take to address 
those towns’ fiscal capacity. Other new laws 
allow any two or more municipalities to 
jointly provide public services and to share 
real and personal property tax revenue. Such 
efforts offer tangible ways to strengthen 
communities facing fiscal and social stress, 
but have yet to come into wide use in the 
state. 
Smarter Planning 
Connecticut is a small state. If it is to 
compete successfully in the global economy 
without ruining its precious suburban and 
rural places, it must devise a much more 
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highly coordinated system of planning—one 
that encourages, empowers and equips 
municipalities, regions and the state to make 
land-use decisions that further common 
goals.   
The present system of uncoordinated 
planning creates many problems for the 
state. It destroys farmland and sensitive 
open space. It increases traffic congestion, 
requires expensive public infrastructure 
investments at the urban edge and squanders 
past investment in more developed cities and 
towns. It promotes social and economic 
separation and unequal housing opportunity.  
Policies should be established that 
encourage local planning with a regional and 
statewide perspective. The following ideas 
should be considered: 
• Equip the state, local governments and 
regional planning organizations with 
better tools to make more informed and 
coordinated decisions in land-use and 
transportation planning. These tools 
should include a statewide geographic 
information system (GIS) usable at 
every level of government, a build-out 
analysis for all 169 municipalities, and a 
statewide cost-of-sprawl study.   
 
• Strengthen the state’s capacity to carry 
out strategic planning and support 
municipalities and regional 
organizations. Additional staff and 
resources should be devoted to this 
effort. 
 
• Use a reinvigorated State Plan of 
Conservation and Development as a 
statewide planning tool. Such a plan can 
be used to promote consistency among 
municipal and regional plans and to 
promote development in desired 
locations.  
• Use the state’s considerable investments 
in infrastructure and schools to 
encourage “smart growth” development 
by focusing funding in target areas. 
• Coordinate planning for economic 
development, public transit and housing 
to provide people with more choice in 
where they live and work and how they 
get around.  
 
• Encourage growth where the 
infrastructure and public facilities to 
support it already exist. Promote 
reinvestment in cities and urbanized 
towns as a springboard to revitalization 
and livability. 
 
• Promote the use of rental-housing 
vouchers in more towns. Enforcement of 
existing state and federal fair housing 
laws should be a priority. 
 
• Vigorously promote homeownership for 
African Americans and Hispanics. 
 
• Expand funding for agricultural and 
open-space preservation programs and 
promote transit-oriented development in 
key corridors. 
Current institutions take the state only part 
way to these goals. For example, towns must 
consider the state plan and note any 
inconsistency with it when amending their 
own plans but they are not required to 
reconcile any differences.41 There are 15 
councils of government (COGs) and 
regional planning agencies across the state, 
but they have no statutory authority to 
review or determine local land-use 
decisions. Many state agencies produce 
plans but they often work independently of 
each other, and they may use different 
regional boundaries for their service 
delivery. There is a state executive branch 
agency with responsibility for policy and 
management, but no state agency explicitly 
responsible for planning. 
The state legislature’s bipartisan Legislative 
Program Review and Investigations 
Committee recently noted the need for 
increased coordination in planning. The 
report criticized the Department of 
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Transportation for the absence of both a 
vision statement and a strategic plan. It also 
criticized the DOT and the Department of 
Economic and Community Development for 
their joint failure to think strategically about 
how transportation investments can 
influence economic growth.42 
There are a variety of models available 
across the country. At least 16 states have 
adopted comprehensive smart growth acts, 
and their ranks are growing. Regional land 
use planning efforts help officials coordinate 
investments in roads, highways, sewers and 
utilities. A number of states, including 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode 
Island, Maine and Connecticut are creating 
planning mechanisms to equitably address 
their water needs while promoting clean 
water and protecting aquatic habitat. 
Concurrency requirements like those in 
Florida mandate that infrastructure be on-
line by the time development takes place. 
Some states offer incentives for the use of 
New Urbanist design principles.43 
Regional Leadership and Decision-
Making 
A primary theme of the Connecticut 
Metropatterns study is the interdependence 
of cities and towns. The cumulative impacts 
of uncoordinated decision-making from 169 
individual actors are increasingly 
detrimental to the long-term health of 
Connecticut. Social and economic 
separation and sprawling development 
patterns harm not just Connecticut’s urban 
centers, but the state as a whole. Individual 
municipalities cannot effectively address 
these problems. They require regional and 
statewide action. 
There are Councils of Governments already 
established in some parts of Connecticut 
that, if strengthened, could encourage 
regional cooperation while honoring 
Connecticut’s tradition of local control. The 
chief elected officials of the participating 
towns hold the power in a COG, which 
provides a means for democratic control and 
accountability. Strengthened COG-like 
structures could make headway on a whole 
host of regional issues, such as land-use 
planning, housing and redevelopment 
efforts, investment in regional priorities and 
the protection of farmland and other open 
space. 
 
By modifying and strengthening existing 
regional entities and emphasizing consensus 
building, it is possible for Connecticut to 
preserve its essential character, improve its 
economic prospects and address its difficult 
problems of concentrated poverty and racial 
segregation.   
Conclusion 
There are ways to strengthen Connecticut’s 
capacity to address its biggest public policy 
challenges while preserving local 
prerogatives. However, the framework for 
addressing these challenges is inherently 
regional and statewide in nature. 
 
• Many initiatives that can help address 
Connecticut’s challenges, such as 
reforms to the state-local revenue 
system and the way K-12 public 
education is financed, can and should be 
carried out by state government. But 
some will require action at the regional 
and municipal level. 
• When regional responses are necessary, 
Connecticut should build on existing 
frameworks and promote broad input 
and accountability. Policymakers should 
empower existing regional entities to 
generate and share more resources at the 
regional level and to gather regional 
input into land-use, transportation and 
environmental issues. The state should 
use strong incentives—including 
financial ones—to promote regional 
cooperation and decision-making. 
These ideas serve as a starting point for a 
larger discussion on how Connecticut can 
retake control of its future. A course 
correction is needed to put the state on the 
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path to greater economic vitality and 
enhanced quality of life. The costs of 
inaction are incalculable. A credible and 
effective system that promotes local, 
regional and statewide cooperation will pay 
dividends for Connecticut and its people for 
generations to come.
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Map 16: Simulated Change in Tax Base 
per Household Resulting from a Tax-Base 
Sharing Program, 1990 to 1999 
Tax-base sharing can both reduce inequality 
among municipalities and decrease the 
incentives for wasteful competition for tax 
base. Because all communities keep a 
majority (but not all) of the growth within 
their borders, the program reduces the 
incentives for inter-local competition for tax 
base while still allowing communities to 
cover the local costs of development. The 
tax-base sharing scenario also reduced tax-
base disparities among communities. The 
ratio between the 95th and 5th percentile 
places in 2000 dropped from 5.3 without 
tax-base sharing to 4.1 with tax-base 
sharing—a decrease of 22 percent. The tax 
base-sharing pool—representing 8 percent 
of the total tax base statewide after nine 
years—increased the local tax base available 
to 70 percent of the state’s population.
Table 1: Characteristics of the Community Types
Growth in
Property Tax Percentage of Percentage Point Percentage of
Property Tax Base per Elementary Change in Elementary Growth in
Percentage Base per Household Students Eligible Free Lunch Students Number of
Number of of State Household (inflation adjusted) for Free Lunch Eligibility Non-Asian Minority Households
Municipalities Population 2000 1995-2000 2000 1993-2000 2000 1995-2000
Cities 4 14 % $113,340 13 % 75 % 1 84 % -1 %
Stressed 12 17 177,120 14 43 5 45 4
At-Risk 43 28 207,724 2 22 2 17 8
Fringe-Developing 30 6 246,031 0 6 0 3 19
Bedroom-Developing 58 24 320,142 12 6 -1 5 10
Affluent 22 11 726,419 36 10 -2 14 6
All Municipalities 169 100 276,803 16 28 1 29 7
Percentage of
Housing Units
Percentage of Affordable to a 
Average Travel Percentage of Jobs Percentage of Property Tax Household at 80%
Households per Time to Work Workers Driving per Resident Percentage Property Tax  Base Commercial- of the Regional
Square Mile (minutes) Alone to Work Household Growth in Jobs  Base Residential Industrial Median Income
2000 2000 Work 2000 1998 1993-1998 2000 2000 2000
Cities 2,283 23 64 % 1.5 -5 % 50 % 27 % 82 %
Distressed 1,050 22 79 1.2 0 65 18 67
Stressed 284 24 84 1.3 5 61 18 53
Fringe-Developing 75 28 84 0.8 11 76 8 35
Bedroom-Developing 197 25 86 1.2 9 70 13 29
Affluent 194 32 70 1.4 11 78 13 22
All Municipalities 264 26 80 1.3 4 69 15 49
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For more information: 
Ameregis 
1313 5th Street SE, Suite 108 
Minneapolis, MN 55414 
phone: (612) 379-3926 
e-mail: ameregis@ameregis.com 
web: www.ameregis.com 
 
Office of Urban Affairs 
The Archdiocese of Hartford 
81 Saltonstall Avenue 
New Haven, CT 06513 
phone: (203) 777-7279 
e-mail: oua@oua-adh.org 
web: www.oua-adh.org 
This document can be viewed at www.oua-
adh.org/CenterEdge_project.htm or 
www.ameregis.com. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Member organizations of the CenterEdge 
Coalition 
African American Affairs Commission, State of 
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Norwich Diocese; Center for Public Policy and 
Practical Politics, Central Connecticut State 
University; Christian Community Action, Inc., 
New Haven; Christian Conference of 
Connecticut; Collaborative Center for Justice; 
Connecticut AFL-CIO; Connecticut Association 
for Human Services; Connecticut Catholic 
Conference; Connecticut Center for a New 
Economy; Connecticut Citizen Action Group; 
Connecticut Civil Liberties Union; Connecticut 
Coalition for Environmental Justice; Connecticut 
Commission on Children; Connecticut 
Conference of Municipalities; Connecticut 
Department of Labor, Center for Faith-Based & 
Community-Based Outreach; Connecticut Fund 
for the Environment; Connecticut Housing 
Coalition; Elm City Congregations Organized; 
Fair Haven Housing Initiative, New Haven; Fair 
Haven NRZ Planning Committee; The Game of 
Life Foundation; The Global Society; Hospital of 
St. Raphael; Latino and Puerto Rican Affairs 
Commission, Connecticut General Assembly; 
MetroHartford Economic Growth Council; 
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 
Inc., New York; National Association of Social 
Workers, CT Chapter; Office for Black Catholic 
Ministries, Archdiocese of Hartford; Office of 
Urban Affairs, Archdiocese of Hartford; 
Partnership for Strong Communities; Prison 
Fellowship Ministries in Connecticut; Regional 
Growth Partnership (New Haven); Rivers 
Alliance of Connecticut, Inc.; Sierra Club, 
Connecticut Chapter; St. Francis Hospital and 
Medical Center; United Action Connecticut; 
United Connecticut Action for Neighborhoods; 
The Connecticut Conference, United Church of 
Christ; Urban League of Greater Hartford, Inc.; 
US Fund for Leadership Training; Yale 
University, Office of New Haven and State 
Affairs 
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